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COMMENTS
"No party to any expropriation proceeding shall be entitled
to or granted a suspensive appeal from any order, judgment,
or decree rendered in such proceeding, whether such order,
judgment, or decree is on the merits, exceptions, or special
pleas and defenses, or any or all of them. The whole of the
judgment, however, shall be subject to the decision of the
appellate court on review under a devolutive appeal."
This final resolution of the question of whether a suspensive
appeal is available is summarized in this excerpt :49
"Articles 2634 and 2636 of the Civil Code have been
amended by Act 92 of 1960 to strengthen the statement in
the first sentence of Article 2634, forbidding suspensive ap-
peals in expropriation cases. The new amendment clearly
precludes suspensive appeals from any facet of an expropria-
tion proceeding."
Prior to 1958, there was some obscurity as to the legal right
of the Department of Highways to reserve to a property owner
minerals and royalties with respect to the expropriation of land
in full ownership. In 1958, an act50 was adopted by the legisla-
ture that set this matter at rest and it is now established prac-
tice to include in all expropriation suits an allegation effecting
such reservation where title is taken in fee or full ownership.
STATUTORY 'RAPE: A CRITIQUE
In the evolution of statutory criminal law two classes of
crimes have emerged in which knowledge and consequently in-
tent are no longer demanded.' One of these classes is "public
welfare offenses." These crimes are violations of statutes de-
signed to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the com-
munity at large and they extend, for example, to the sale of
49. Legislative Symposium of 1960-Civil Code and Related Subject Matter,
21 LA. L. REV. 53, 62 (1960).
50. LA. R.S.. 9:5806 (1950).
1. Smith v. State, 71 Fla. 639, 642, 71 So. 915, 916 (1916) : "While all com-
mon-law crimes consist of two elements-the criminal act or omission, and the
mental element, commonly called criminal intent, it is within the power of the
Legislature to dispense with the necessity for a criminal intent, and to punish
particular acts without regard to the mental attitude of the doer." See also Sayre,
The Present Significance of Mens Rea in the Criminal Law, in HARVARD LEGAL
ESSAYS 399, 407 (1934); Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLU-M. L. REV.
55 (1933).
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food, drugs, liquor, and to traffic offenses. 2 The other class
excludes intent but on a different basis and is composed of
narcotic, bigamy, and statutory rape crimes.8
The crime of statutory rape is based on the conclusive pre-
sumption that a female under a certain age cannot legally con-
sent to sexual intercourse.4 If the female is incapable of con-
senting, it logically follows that any act of intercourse must
have been against her will and hence must constitute rape. The
male may reasonably suppose that he received the consent of
a female mistakenly believed to be of legal age, only to find that
he has received no legally recognizable consent. In this situa-
tion, his perhaps reasonable ignorance of the girl's age and con-
sequent lack of criminal intent are no defense.5 The act alone
suffices to establish guilt. This is the position taken by most
states.6
The English Sexual Offences Act of 1956 provides that if a
female is between the ages of thirteen and sixteen, mistake of
2. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) ; People v. Sweeney,
66 Cal. App. 2d 855, 153 P.2d 371 (1944) ; State v. Dahnke, 244 Iowa 599, 57
N.W.2d 553 (1953) ; Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55
(1933). Interesting in this light are the results of a study set forth in Remington,
Liability Without Fault Criminal Statutes-Their Relation to Major Develop-
ments in Contemporary Economic and Social Policy: The Situation in Wisconsin,
1956 Wis. L. REV. 625, 667, where it was found that a large percentage of
criminal statutes in Wisconsin do not expressly require proof of fault for con-
viction.
3. CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMES 699 (bigamy), 247, 295 (adultery), 675 (rape)(6th ed. 1958) ; HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 395-401 (bigamy),
374 (narcotics), 373 (rape) (2d ed. 1960) ; PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 836
(bigamy), 700, 833 (adultery), 708 (narcotics), 110, 127, 699, 833 (rape)
(1957).
4. LA. R.S. 14:80 (1950); Rose v. United States, 240 Fed. 685 (1917);
Ollis v. State, 44 Ga. App. 793, 163 S.E. 309 (1932) ; Golden v. Commonwealth,
289 Ky. 379, 158 S.W.2d 967 (1942) ; Bennett, The Louisiana Criminal Code:
A Comparison with Prior Louisiana Criminal Law, 5 LA. L. REv. 6, 41 (1942).
5. Miller v. State, 16 Ala. App. 534, 79 So. 314 (1918) ; Anderson v. State,
384 P.2d 669 (Alaska 1963) ; Heath v. State, 173 Ind. 296, 90 N.E. 310 (1910) ;
State v. Baker, 276 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. 1955) ; State v. Houx, 109 Mo. 654,
19 S.W. 35 (1892).
6. Louisiana (LA. R.S. 14:80 (1950)), Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.02
(9) (6) (1953)), and Wisconsin (WIs. STAT. ch. 939.43 (1963)), explicitly ex-
clude a defense based on mistake or ignorance of the female's age. New Mexico al-
lows the defense when the female is between thirteen and sixteen, but excludes it if
the female is below thirteen (N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 40A-9-3, 4 (1953)). Illinois
gives the prosecutor the choice of charging statutory rape as a felony, in which
case ignorance of the female's age will be a defense, or of charging statutory rape
as a misdemeanor for which ignorance of age is not a defense (ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, § 11-4, 5 (1964)). The statutes of nine other states either allows ignorance
of the female's age as a defense or provide that there must be a union of act
and intent to constitute a crime (Arizona, Colorado, California, Georgia, Idaho,
Montana, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah). Thirty-six states have statutes which simply
provide the male is liable for carnal knowledge of a female without any explicit
mention of intent.
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fact as to age may be a defense. 7 The position of the American
Law Institute's Model Penal Code is similar except that the
Code extends the age from ten to sixteen and demands the actor
be at least four years older than the girl.8 Should the female
be within these age limits there is a presumption that she was
known to be underage and as a result the act alone suffices for
conviction; however, the presumption is rebuttable. Thus upon
sufficient showing a mistake of fact as to age may constitute
a valid defense. If the female is below thirteen under the Eng-
lish Act9 or below ten under the Model Penal Code' ° mistake
of fact as to age cannot be a defense. Here the act alone suf-
fices to establish guilt because there is a conclusive rather than
a rebuttable presumption that the male had knowledge of the
female's age. The rationale is that if the statutory age is placed
low enough, it becomes extremely improbable that a mistake of
age could be made."
Thus it appears that the English Act and the Model Penal
Code establish a minimum age below which, it is believed, a
female definitely lacks the capacity to fully understand the im-
plications of intercourse and hence cannot legally consent to it.
Above this minimum age it is recognized that some females
may be more sexually sophisticated than others, and the un-
wary male who may have believed the girl to be of age and
capable of legal consent is allowed to introduce evidence to over-
come the presumption that he was aware of the female's age.
R.S. 14:42 provides that sexual intercourse with females
under the age of twelve is aggravated rape. The statute ex-
pressly states that "lack of knowledge of the female's age shall
not be a defense."'12 Like the English Act and the Model Penal
Code this statute establishes a minimum age below which mis-
take of age is highly improbable and consequently is excluded as
a defense.
Another statute, R.S. 14:80,13 provides that the offense of
7. Sexual Offences Act, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 69, § 6 (1956).
8. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1) (d) (1962).
9. Sexual Offences Act, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 69, §§ 5-6 (1956). This statute also
requires that the male must be under twenty-four years of age and never
previously charged with a similar offense. If these conditions are not met, then
mistake of age is not a defense and the act alone suffices to insure conviction.
10. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(1) (1962).
11. Id. § 207.4(10), (11) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). See also PLoscowl,
SEx AND THE LAW 167-81 (1951) ; Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 82 (1952).
12. LA. R.S. 14:42(3) (1950).
13. Id. 14:80.
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carnal knowledge of a juvenile is committed whenever anyone
over the age of seventeen has sexual intercourse with an un-
married female between the ages of twelve and seventeen with
her consent. This statute expressly states that "lack of knowl-
edge of the female's age shall not be a defense. 1 4 The Lou-
isiana position therefore differs from that of the English Act
and the Model Penal Code, for under the latter two, if the female
were between the ages of twelve and seventeen there would be
a rebuttable presumption that the male was aware of the fe-
male's true age; but under the Louisiana provision, the pre-
sumption is conclusive.
This was not always the position taken by Louisiana.15 A
former statute 6 placed the legal age at eighteen and was silent
regarding lack of knowledge, of the juvenile's age as a defense.
However, State v. Dierlamm,17 decided under this statute, held
that it was not necessary for the state to prove the male knew
the female was under eighteen; the act alone would suffice for
liability.' The court stated that since the statute "makes no
mention of felonious intent or guilty knowledge" the offense
defined in the statute is purely a statutory crime.'9 This rule
was codified in the present Louisiana statute.2 0
It is submitted that the Dierlamm decision may be criticized
on two grounds. First, it does not seem logical to assign the
statute's silence regarding criminal intent as the reason for
14. Ibid.
15. If past decisions bad consistently supported the view that silence as
regards intent indicated that the act alone sufficed for liability then such reason-
ing would be justified. But such is not the case; rather, Louisiana criminal
statutes, proposed codes, and cases, from Livingston to the codification of the
decision in State v. Dierlamm, 189 La. 544, 180 So. 135 (1938), have warned
of the danger of reading out intent. For a complete chronological analysis see
LIvINGSTON, REPORT MADE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF LoUIsi-
ANA ON THE PLAN OF A PENAL CODE (1822) ; State v. Miller, 42 La. Ann. 1186,
8 So. 309 (1890) ; La. Acts 1896, No. 115; DRAFT OF A PENAL CODE FOR THE STATE
OF LOUISIANA, prepared under Gov. Murphy J. Foster (1898) ; MARR, CRIMINAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF LOUISIANA (1906) : State v. Mehojovich, 118 La. 1013, 43 So.
660 (1907) ; La. Acts 1912, No. 192; Brunet v. Deshotels, 160 La. 285, 107 So.
111 (1926); MARR, CRIMINAL STATUTES OF LOUISIANA (1929) ; DART, CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND CRIMINAL STATUTES OF TIlE STATE OF LOUISIANA
(1932).
16. La. Acts 1912, No. 192(1) (the statutory age was from twelve to eighteen).
17. 189 La. 544, 180 So. 135 (1938).
18. Ibid.
19. 189 La. 544, 559, 180 So. 135, 139 (1938).
20. See LA. R.S. 14:80 (1950) and Reporter's Comment. This comment
points out the arbitrary method by which the age of consent was determined.
The former statute provided the age of eighteen, the Reporters favored sixteen,
but the Advisors favored a higher age. The compromise age of seventeen was
decided upon.
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deciding against the necessity for intent; rather, the statute's
silence is only the occasion for deciding and as such does not
indicate what decision should be made. Moreover, the usual
tendency is to demand intent when a statute is silent regarding
it. 21 Second, the court cites five cases as precedent,22 but a
careful scrutiny of these cases will reveal that they in no way
support the decision reached in Dierlamm.
In State v. Berger,2 3 the court held that if the statute is silent
regarding intent, the indictment need not charge intent; the
words of the statute will be sufficient. This does not lend sup-
port to the Dierlamm decision. The indictment need not charge
intent because the court has not yet decided whether intent must
be proved to constitute a crime under the statute in question.
This is a question for judicial interpretation, hardly one to be
determined in the issuance of an indictment. Therefore, when
the statute is silent on criminal intent, the words of the statute
should suffice for a valid indictment. This in no way impedes
the court's subsequently reading criminal intent into the statute.
In State v. Standard Petroleum Co. 24 the court was treating
an entirely different area, the violation of a public welfare law
regulating the sale of substandard gasoline. 25 The act in ques-
tion contained two clauses: one, providing that anyone who
"places in tanks, pumps, . . . gasoline . . . contrary to the provi-
sions of this Act" is guilty of an offense under the Act; and,
two, that whoever "shall willingly use any [inaccurate] pump"
is guilty of an offense under the act.26 The charge was brought
under clause one and it was held that since the second clause
expressly provided that the act must be done "willingly" it fol-
lows that criminal intent was necessary under it, but not under
the first clause. The court reasoned that if the legislature had
intended criminal intent to be an element under clause one, they
would have expressly included it as they had done under clause
two. In the Dierlamm case, there are no clauses to provide so
21. See note 15 supra for Louisiana development. For the common law
tradition see 2 BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 121 (Twiss
ed. 1879) ; 1 HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 14 (1736) ; STEPHEN,
A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND ch. 4 (1890).
22. State v. Standard Petroleum Prod. Co., 176 La. 647, 146 So. 321 (1933)
State v. Berger, 156 La. 737, 101 So. 124 (1924) ; State v. Quinn, 131 La. 490,
59 So. 913 (1912) ; State v. Dowdell, 106 La. 645, 31 So. 151 (1902) ; State
v. Southern R.R., 122 N.C. 1053, 30 S.E. 133 (1898).
23. 156 La. 737, 101 So. 124 (1924).
24. 176 La. 647, 146 So. 321 (1933).
25. See note 2 supra.
26. La. Acts 1932, No. 14.
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facile an interpretation of legislative intent. Finally, in Stand-
ard Petroleum the court, in dicta, pointed out that "even in
criminal law when a statute makes an act indictable without
regard to guilty knowledge, then ignorance of fact, although
sincere, is no defense, and the intent with which the act is done
is of no consequence. ' 27 This is the language utilized by the
court in Dierlamm. The statement, as such, is valid. The state-
ment is not valid if it is meant to apply to statutes which are
merely silent as regards intent. 28
In State v. Quinn,29 the court held that proof of an offer of
money to a witness in a criminal trial is sufficient to convict
of bribery without the necessity of also proving criminal intent.
The court seems to be saying that the proof of an offer of money
to a witness is sufficient to constitute a manifestation of an
intent to bribe. Note that the present bribery statute requires
criminal intent, "the intent to influence his [the witness'] con-
duct."3 0 Therefore, the Quinn decision has been repealed by the
legislature.
In State v. Dowdell,3 1 the defendant lay in wait and shot at
the prosecuting witness as he emerged from a rooming house.
Indictment was based on an act making it unlawful "to shoot at
any dwelling house, any person [being] therein. '32 Defendant
asserted that he was shooting at a man on the porch and was
unaware of the house and consequently that he lacked the in-
tent to shoot at the rooming house. The court ruled that the
trial judge need not instruct the jury that "if he shot at the
person with intent to kill, but without any intent to shoot at
the dwelling house, he could not be guilty under the statute."
Today the doctrine of transferred intent would obviate the dif-
ficulty.8 4
The final case cited in Dierlamm is State v. Southern R.R.9
This case can easily be dismissed for it concerns ignorance of
law and not of fact. One cannot justifiably reason from the
denial of ignorance of law as a defense that criminal intent
27. 176 La. 647, 650, 146 So. 321, 322 (1933).
28. See note 3 supra.
29. 131 La. 490, 59 So. 913 (1912).
30. LA. R.S. 14:118 (1950).
31. 106 La. 645, 31 So. 151 (1902).
32. La. Acts 1870, No. 8(8).
33. 106 La. 645, 646, 31 So. 151, 152 (1902).
34. See PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 713 (1957).
35. 122 N.C. 1052, 30 S.E. 133 (1898).
[Vol. XXVI
COMMENTS
is not an element of the statute under which the offense is
brought.3 6
To dispense with the reasoning and precedents of the Dier-
lamm case is not necessarily to suppose that the legislature was
unwise in codifying that decision. Perhaps other reasons exist
that make it wise to adopt such a statute; basic policy con-
siderations could have had a decisive influence. Two policy
considerations frequently advocated are: first, that it is de-
sirable to provide the fullest possible protection to the innocent
and naive female child incapable of understanding the nature
of sexual intercourse; 37 and, second, that the act done is im-
moral in itself, malum in se, and so it is appropriate to hold that
the offender acts at his peril.38
The first policy consideration has as its purpose the pro-
tection of the sexually immature female who lacks the capacity
to understand the nature and implications of the sexual act. To
achieve this, an age standard is established below which females
are considered sexually immature and above which they are
considered mature. However, past puberty (which is itself a
variable within limits) there is no assurance that every girl
below a certain age is sexually immature and that every one
above it is sexually mature. Accordingly it is submitted that
age alone does not adequately demarcate the two groups 39 when,
as in the United States, these minimum ages range from seven
to twenty-one years. 40 If age alone does not effect an adequate
division then difficulties are presented.
First, it would seem reasonable to allow the accused to intro-
duce evidence of the female's maturity, sophistication, and past
sexual experience, since her maturity is the chief concern and
age is but a determinative factor indicating the presence or
absence of maturity. Yet generally such evidence is inadmis-
sible.41
36. See CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMES 297 (6th ed. 1958); HALL, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 376-414 (2d ed. 1960).
37. State v. Bowden, 154 Fla. 511, 18 So.2d 478 (1944); Holton v. State,
28 Fla. 303, 9 So. 716 (1891) ; State v. Huntsman, 115 Utah 283, 204 P.2d 448
(1949) ; Parsons v. Parker, 160 Va. 810, 170 S.E. 1 (1933).
38. State v. Houx, 109 Mo. 654, 19 S.W. 35 (1892); CLARK & MARSHALL,
CRIMES § 5.04 (6th ed. 1958); HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
chs. 3, 4 (2d ed. 1960) ; PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 127 (1957).
39. PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 181 (1951) ; Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 82
(1952). Both commentators set the age of consent at fourteen.
40. MUELLER, LEGAL REGULATION OF SEXUAL CONDUCT 74-80 (1961).
41. People v. Marks, 146 App. Div. 11, 12, 130 N.Y. Supp. 524, 525 (1911)
"[N]either the consent, nor previous unchastity of the girl, nor her representa-
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Second, the age standard (unless it is low enough) with its
universal application draws an arbitrary line above and below
which line breaches of justice are almost certain to occur.42
Third, if the age standard is placed too high, and without
doubt this has happened in the United States, it results in the
anomaly of a female legally able to consent to marriage but,
in that same state, not legally able to consent to intercourse.43
The second policy consideration often put forward is that
the act is immoral, malum in se, and sufficient to constitute
guilt regardless of intent.44 This assertion, that an act is malum
in se, when made either by the legislature or by the courts, is
tions, nor information derived from others as to her age, nor her appearance
with respect to age is a defense to a prosecution." Parsons v. Parker, 160 Va.
810, 170 S.E. 1 (1933), in dictum stated that chastity or virginity is not a pre-
requisite to the commission of statutory rape. Louisiana has followed the same
trend. See State v. Patterson, 176 La. 1013, 147 So. 62 (1933) ; State v.
Menard, 169 La. 11,97, 126 So. 921 (1930) ; State v. Holland, 169 La. 149, 124
So. 675 (1929) ; State v. Mischior, 165 La. 705, 115 So. 909 (1.928) ; State v.
Williams, 161 La. 851, 109 So. 515 (1926); State v. Gibbs, 153 La. 274, 95
So. 716 (1923); State v. Higdon, 153 La. 374, 95 So. 868 (1923) ; State v.
Romero, 117 La. 1003, 42 So. 482 (1906).
42. See State v. Snow, 252 S.W. 629, 632 (Mo. 1923): "We have in this
case a condition and not a theory. This wretched girl was young in years but old
in sin and shame. A number of callow youths, of otherwise blameless lives . . .
fell under her seductive influence. They flocked about her . . . like moths about
the flame of a lighted candle and probably with the same result. The girl
was a common prostitute .... The boys were immature and doubtless more sinned
against than sinning. . . Why should the boys, misled by her, be sacrificed?
What sound public policy can be subserved by branding them as felons? Might
it not be wise to ingraft an exception in the Statute?" The defendants were
convicted. In this case, even if there exists no mistake of fact as to the girl's
age, justice would seem to demand that the defendants be released. The capacity-
to-consent test would certainly have resulted in their release had it been applied.
See Elkins v. State, 167 Tenn. 546, 72 S.W.2d 550 (1934), reversed on other
grounds. Here the female was within thirty days of the statutory age of twenty-
one, had been married, but was now separated from her husband. The court
held she could not give her consent under the statute. The court in People
v. Derbert, 138 Cal. 467, 469, 71 Pac. 564, (1903) stated: "Under the Statute the
girl may be the older and more aggressive of the two, and the real seducer ...
She may be a common prostitute and seduce a boy of fifteen, and yet in such case
the boy is guilty of felony, while to her the law awards no punishment."
Nor is it any defense to assert that these inadequacies should have been taken
care of through administrative justice, that prosecutors should not have brought
the actions and judges should have suspended sentences. The above are cases
where actions were brought and sentences not suspended. See Comment, 62 YALE
L. J. 55, 81, 82 (1952). Moreover, HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
343 (2d ed. 1960), has pointed out that no one would think of maintaining such
a position regarding any major crime, e.g., a statute which provided that anyone
who killed a human being must be held guilty of murder, on the ground that
the statute would be enforced only against those who killed with malice afore-
thought. This is to render judgment before trial.
43. PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 184 (1951).
44. See note 38 supra. Additionally, since the act itself is immoral, even if
the facts were as they are mistakenly believed to be, the actor should still be
punished. See State v. Ruhl, 13 Iowa (8 Clarke) 447 (1859) ; State v. Houx, 109
Mo. 654, 19 S.W. 35 (1892) ; Regina v. Tolson, 23 Q.B.D. 168 (1889).
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an extension beyond the realm of legal judgments into that of
moral philosophy and is replete with difficulties and ambigui-
ties.
First, it might cogently be argued that it is not the function
of the legislature to promulgate morality or of the courts to
base their interpretations and decisions on moral judgments.
The awesome difficulty of determining moral or ethical truths
admittedly valid and applicable has in the past precluded both
legislatures and courts from considering such to be within their
proper activity. This is not to deny that certain moral offenses
are also legal offenses, but they are not legal offenses solely
because they are moral ones.4 5
Second, to hold that an act is immoral in itself, divorced
from any consideration of the intention of the actor, is contrary
to the general consensus of what makes an act moral or immoral.
Rather, the consensus seems to be that an act is made moral or
immoral by the intention with which it is done.4 6 Thus, to kill
for self gain is considered immoral while to kill in defense of
one's country is considered moral, even praiseworthy. To im-
pose strict liability based on a judgment that the act is immoral
in itself is to disregard the commonly accepted criterion of
guilt-a dubious position when the stakes are so high.
Third, the assertion that the act alone will suffice for lia-
bility without the necessity of proving criminal intent is con-
trary to the traditional demand of the criminal law that only
the act plus criminal intent is sufficient to constitute a crime. 47
45. Holmes, Early Forms of Liability, in THE COMMON LAW 33 (Howe ed.
1963) ; 2 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF TH=E CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 94, 95 (1883) :
"Actus non facit rerum nisi mens sit rea ...is frequently though ignorantly sup-
posed to mean that there cannot be such a thing as legal guilt where there is
no moral guilt, which is obviously untrue, as there is always a possibility of
conflict between law and morals." See also CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMES 81-86
(6th ed. 1958).
46. Holmes, Early Forms of Liability, in TiE CommON LAW 7 (Howe ed.
1963) : "Even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked."
Intention is seen as demanding premeditation and therefore maximum culpa-
bility. See BRADLEY, ETHICAL STUDIES, Essay 1 (1876). See also MOORE,
ETHICS 14 (1944) ; MOORE, PHILOSOPHY 180 (1942), where a duty violated by a
person able to conform to it suffices to establish the moral culpability of the
actor's conduct. "When the famous actor, Garrick, was said to have declared that
he felt like a murderer whenever he acted Richard III, Dr. Johnson, as a moral
philospher, retorted; 'Then he ought to be hanged whenever he acts it'." PERKINS,
CRIMINAL LAW 652 (1957). See also STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 3, 4 (1890).
47. State v. Blue, 17 Utah 175, 181, 53 Pac. 978, 980 (1898) : "To
prevent the punishment of the innocent, there has been ingrafted into our system
of jurisprudence, as presumably in every other, the principle that the wrongful
1965]
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The criminal law has devised an intricate system of classification
of crimes based on the kind or degree of intent present and this
system is founded on the general consensus that intention colors
the offense, that punishment should be weighted according to
the presence and degree of intent found.48 To disregard inten-
tion is to go contrary to this tradition.49
Fourth, is it not possible that considering an act malum in se
today is merely the outgrowth of some positive system of law
which at one time had prohibited the act and then had handed
down the prohibition from generation to generation? For
example, sexual intercourse between parents and children was
not always viewed as malum, much less as malum in se.51 If
there is so much difficulty in distinguishing positive prohibi-
tions from moral ones it would seem unwise to utilize such a
distinction in determining the admissibility of intent.52
Fifth, if an act is immoral in itself it must always have
been so and it must always have been recognized as such. If
not, there is no ground for the assertion that the act is essen-
tially immoral. Now it is questionable to assert that intercourse
with a female between the ages of twelve and seventeen is
immoral in itself. In certain cultures girls are married and
mothers at that age. Is it only within the confines of this era
and within the geographical limits of the county or more spe-
or criminal intent is the essence of the crime, without which it cannot exist."
2 BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 121 (Twiss ed. 1879) :
"With intention, as if anyone with certain knowledge and with a premeditated
assault, through anger or hatred, or for the cause of gain, wickedly . . . has slain
a person." 1 HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 14 (1736): "The
consent of the will is that, which renders human actions either commendable or
culpable." Also, id. at 15: "[W]here there is no will to commit an offense,
there can he no . . . just reason to incur the penalty."
48. CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMES 57 (6th ed. 1958) ; HALL, GENERAL PRIN-
CIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 310, 316 (2d ed. 1960).
49. See notes 45 and 46 supra.
50. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 341 (2d ed. 1960).
51. XENOPHON, MEMORABILIA IV, 4, 19 (Burnet ed. 1930).
52. Some philosophers assert that acts are immoral insofar as they violate
some abstract standard, i.e., of human nature, of the state's good, of greatest
pleasure, of greatest happiness, of most utility. See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGICA Ia, IIae, 90-91, 95-96, 99-102, ad 2 (Pegis ed. 1948) ; ARISTOTLE,
ETHICA NICOMACHEA 1094a, 1-3, 1094b, 27, 1177a, 12-13 (Smith & Ross 2d ed.
1928); BERGSON, THE SOURCES OF MORALITY AND RELIGION 9 (Audra & Bre-
reton ed. 1935) ; BERKELEY, PHILOSOPHICAL COMMENTARIES 769, I, 93 (Luce &
Jessop eds. 1948) ; HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 146-63 (2d ed.
1960); HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 4, 44, 46-47 (1881): LOCKE, AN ESSAY
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 2, 20, 2, I, 303; 2, 28, 5, I, 474 (Pringle-
Patterson, Oxford, 1924) ; PLATO, PHILEBUS In, 1-a, 1 (Bohn ed. 1858). This,
in reality, is to beg the question of the act's inherent immorality and to posit
some other standard which the act allegedly violates; as such, the act itself can be
no more than indifferent.
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cifically of contemporary Louisiana that such an act is "in-
herently immoral"?
It seems the courts are implying that intercourse with a
female incapable of understanding the nature of the act, the
sexually immature female, is malum in se. The idea can be ex-
pressed in a syllogism:
To have intercourse with a sexually immature female is
malum in se.
This female is sexually immature.
Therefore, to have intercourse with this female is malum
in se.
By concluding from age alone that the female is sexually im-
mature, the courts are failing to allow the defendant to con-
test the minor premise. Evidence of past sexual promuscuity, of
sophistication, and experience should be considered relevant,
but the a priori judgment that age alone is an adequate standard
prevents admission of this evidence and thus often has the
effect of thwarting justice.
Acceptance of the idea that intercourse with a female be-
tween the ages of twelve and seventeen is malum in se is seen
to be dependent on the particular cultural environment; there-
fore the act cannot be essentially immoral or malum in se. Even
admitting that intercourse with a sexually immature female
could be considered malum in se, the admission presupposes
proof of the maturity or immaturity of the female-a proof the
courts have failed to admit. By equating age and capacity the
courts are reverting to the completely untenable position that
age alone is sufficient to establish the act as malum in se. It is
submitted that the policy considerations traditonally offered
as reasons for imposing strict liability in statutory rape offenses
are not valid.
A recent California decision seems to provide support for
this conclusion. In People v. Hernandez53 the defendant was
charged with statutory rape under the California Penal Code.5'
Specifically, to determine whether sexual intercourse with one below a certain
age is immoral in itself, a criterion must be selected. Conceivably, different
judgments could arise depending on the criterion selected. Even within any selected
criterion, different results could be reached. It is submitted that such a distinc-
tion should not be the basis for imputing strict liability.
53. 61 Cal.2d 529, 393 P.2d 673 (1964).
54. CALIF. PENAL CODE § 261(1): "Rape is an act of sexual intercourse,
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The prosecutrix, seventeen years and nine months old, had dated
the defendant for several months. The trial court refused to
allow the defendant to introduce evidence that he had a reason-
able belief that she was over eighteen. The district court of
appeals affirmed, 55 but the Supreme Court of California re-
versed, holding that without criminal intent there could be no
crime. In so holding, the court was acutely aware of the policy
considerations enumerated above ;56 however, it pointed out that
the purpose of the California statute is to protect infants: "No
responsible person would hesitate to condemn as untenable a
claimed good faith belief in the age of consent of an 'infant'
female whose obviously tender years precluded the existence of
reasonable grounds for that belief. '5 7 Yet in cases where the
girl was sexually sophisticated owing either to cultural factors
or to her own experience the public interest is not served by
excluding mistake of fact as a defense."' Thus, "in the absence
of legislative direction otherwise, a charge of statutory rape
is defensible wherein a criminal intent is lacking." 59 Finally,
the court noted that this holding was a logical extension of
People v. Vogel,60 which it stated, held "that a good faith belief
that a former wife had obtained a divorce was a valid defense
to a charge of bigamy arising out of a second marriage when
the first marriage had not in fact been terminated." 61
The Hernandez decision, it is submitted, is an advance in
the right direction. It turns from an absolute standard of age
accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, under either of the
following circumstances: 1. where the female is under the age of eighteen
years ... "
55. 29 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1963).
56. These had been clearly enumerated in People v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132, 133
46 Pac. 915, 916 (1898). There the Supreme Court of California followed the
decision of Regina v. Prince, L.R. 2 Crown Cas. 154 (1875), and ruled that
reasonable belief that the girl was over the age of consent would not justify an
absence of consent necessary to constitute a crime. The court ruled that the
"protection of society, of the family, and of the infant, demand that one who
has carnal influence under such circumstances shall do so in peril of the fact."
115 Cal. 132, 133, 46 Pac. 915, 916 (1898). However, fornication is not a crime
in California. See In re Lane, 58 Cal.2d 99, 104, 372 P.2d 897, 900 (1962).
Moreover, the threats to society and the family-illegitimacy, unwed mothers,
venereal disease-are still present when the girl is past the age of consent. Thus
protection of society and the family do not appear as important as Prince would
lead us to believe. The Prince case was repealed ten years later by legislation
and the Ratz case which followed both Prince and the overruling legislation
appealed to Prince as precedent and ignored the subsequent legislation.
57. 61 Cal.2d 529, 536, 393 P.2d 673, 677 (1964).
58. Id. at 530, 393 P.2d at 674.
59. Id. at 536, 393 P.2d at 677.
60. 46 Cal.2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956).
61. People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal.2d 529, 531, 393 P.2d 673, 677 (1964).
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to the intent necessary to constitute the crime. In so doing, it
recognizes that the purpose of the statute is to protect the
emotionally and sexually immature rather than all females
under a certain age. It recognizes that age may be indicative
of sexual immaturity and that in such cases a mistake of age
would lack a reasonable basis. In so recognizing, it does not
ignore the intent of the male, but simply infers that, in par-
ticular circumstances, the male must have intended to take ad-
vantage of an immature girl. As a result, each case can be
treated on its facts and such abuses of justice as the previous
rule fostered can be avoided.
As has been seen, the central issue in statutory rape seems
to be that of operative consent. The Hernandez decision does
not go far enough to confront this issue directly. It allows
mistake of age to be a defense, but does not extend the defense
to cases where, although there is no mistake of age, the girl
is sexually mature and comprehends the nature of her consent.
If, as seems likely, the statute was not designed to protect this
wise but underage female, if follows that one should treat as
rebuttable the presumption that a young girl lacks the capacity
to consent. The defendant should be allowed to introduce
evidence to show that the girl understood the significance of the
act and her consent should therefore have the same effect as
that of a legally mature female. It is submitted that the female's
capacity to grant operative consent could be a question for the
jury, just as it is in rape cases where the girl is alleged to be
mentally incompetent. This rebuttable presumption would
continue to protect the naive and innocent, but the law would
no longer punish the man who copulates with a girl fully capable
of understanding the significance of her participation.
Richard A. Tonry
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAX: EFFECT OF LOU-
ISIANA POWERS TO REVOKE INTER VIVOS DONATIONS
The basic incident of taxation by the federal estate or gift
tax' is the transfer of property. The estate tax is imposed on
the transfer of property at death 2 and on certain inter vivos
1. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, subtitle B.
2. Id. §§ 2001, 2031, 2051. See Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S.
327 (1928) ; McCaughn v. Fidelity Trust Co., 34 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1929);
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